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INTRODUCTION
International harmonization of competition laws is in the air. A
large number of academics have called for harmonization of the
substantive content of antitrust laws.' They have noted the
potentially large costs of divergent national antitrust laws applied
globally. These costs include the transactions costs for companies
complying with multiple regimes2 and the costs of being governed
by the most restrictive antitrust regime, even if that regime is
suboptimal.' More importantly, as a practical matter, the recent
Doha meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has called
for the next round of world trade talks to take steps toward
harmonization, including harmonization of certain core substantive
standards.4 Thus, the intellectual impetus for harmonization now
may enjoy a plausible forum for its realization.
In my view, substantive harmonization, even if limited to core
competition standards, would be a major mistake. It is undoubtedly
true that multiple regimes impose some costs, but substantive
harmonization-by which I mean a single international regime
binding on all nation states in at least some areas of antitrust-also
has potential costs. An international lawmaking regime creates
high agency costs because it is less subject to democratic control
1. See, e.g., Sharon E. Foster, While America Slept: The Harmonization of Competition
Laws Based Upon the European Union Model, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 467 (2001); Eleanor
M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INTL L. 1 (1997). For early
works in this canon, see, for example, F. M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994); Eleanor M. Fox, The End of Antitrust Isolationism:
The Vision of One World, 1992 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 221.
2. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77
B.U. L. REv. 343, 385-86 (1997).
3. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITrEE TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL
REPORT 52 (2000), available at http'i/www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpaclfinalreport.htm [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT].
4. Paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration addresses harmonization issues, and calls for
considering the inclusion within the WTO of "core principles, including transparency, non-
discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions ... [prohibiting] hardcore cartels;
modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building."See World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01YDEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 746
(2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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than national regimes.5 It also imposes costs by discouraging
beneficial change, as the regime once in place will be difficult to
alter.6 Moreover, the appropriate scope of antitrust law in different
nations may differ, depending on such factors as the size of their
markets, their openness to trade, and their administrative compe-
tence in enforcing regulatory laws.7 Thus, an international regime
might well lead to an overall worse world competition policy.
The long-run costs of a substantive antitrust regime are particu-
larly problematic in a world that is not static. As information costs,
transportation costs, and trade restrictions decline, it may well be
that the appropriate scope of optimal antitrust rules will tend to
narrow as market processes become better correctives to market
imperfections than government intervention. The lock-in costs of an
international regime thus are particularly high in a world in which
the pace of change is ever increasing.
In contrast to substantive harmonization, I offer an argument for
a limited and modest antidiscrimination international antitrust
regime located within the WTO. The rationale for this regime,
however, comes principally from international trade law rather
than antitrust law. Foreign bias in competition laws is likely to
become a greater problem as the WTO eliminates tariff and other
barriers to trade in goods and services. The WTO should block
substitution of discriminatory antitrust law for barriers that it has
removed in order to sustain progress in world trade. This effort
would be a modest extension of its existing mission: it already
attempts to prohibit many other forms of regulatory discrimination
that interfere with exporters' market access.
The antidiscrimination model also has advantages over sub-
stantive harmonization, because formulating and applying antidis-
crimination rules have fewer agency costs than formulating and
applying substantive rules.8 Moreover, the antidiscrimination model
permits continued innovation and change in substantive rules, thus
5. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
6. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 157-64.
8. See discussion infra Part III.C.
[Vol. 45:549552
POLITICAL ECONOMY
facilitating continued debate regarding the optimal content of
regulation.9
Part I of this Article will critique the arguments for substantive
harmonization of antitrust laws. It will suggest that these argu-
ments are unpersuasive because they fail to show that the costs
of our decentralized system of competition law are greater than
the agency costs and associated pathologies of more centralized
rulemaking and enforcement. In particular, arguments for substan-
tive harmonization fail to recognize that a decentralized system
has a certain dynamism over the long-run: the conflicts between
different systems may become a focus of public attention and lead
to better laws. ° In contrast, a harmonized international regime
faces a greater danger of stasis."
Part II of this Article will address a new argument that interna-
tional cooperation on substantive antitrust is necessary because
domestic antitrust regimes neglect foreign consumer and producer
interests, thus departing from an optimal antitrust standard. First,
this Part will use the U.S. antitrust regime as an example to sug-
gest that some institutional structures, such as an independent
judiciary, tend to constrain this bias in some circumstances. 2 In
other cases, this bias, even if unrestrained, may compensate for
public choice flaws in a domestic antitrust system and actually may
result in a more efficient competition policy.13
Part III of this Article will provide a sketch for a limited anti-
discrimination model of international competition law. It will first
show that the neglected rationale for some policing of domestic
antitrust law is that antidiscrimination requirements are necessary
to protect the efficacy of both the WTO's tariff reductions and its
elimination of other trade restrictions.
I then discuss briefly the limited and incremental nature of
antidiscrimination principles that the WTO should embrace. WTO
enforcement of antidiscrimination rules should be limited to
discrimination that creates nontariff barrier substitutes for tariff
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C.
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barriers such as antitrust rules that discriminate in market access.
Only that kind of discrimination undermines the WTO regime.
Until more evidence develops that foreign bias is a serious problem
in the administration of antitrust laws, I might well apply the
antidiscrimination regime only to expressly discriminatory laws.
Third, even if the WTO were to broaden its antidiscrimination
regime to include discriminatory application of antitrust laws, it
should consider ways of assuring nondiscrimination through the use
of domestic institutions rather than increasing the power of WTO
tribunals.
I also describe the concrete advantages of an antidiscrimination
regime over substantive harmonization. First, it will preserve
substantive diversity and therefore experimentation, preventing
lock-in problems." Second, it will avoid many public choice
problems that would make suboptimal substantive harmonization
likely.15 Third, an antidiscrimination model will comport with the
rest of WTO jurisprudence and, if the model is located there, will
benefit from the WTO's already established institutional structure,
which includes a sophisticated jurisprudence for ferreting out
discriminatory laws.' Unlike substantive rules, an antidiscrimi-
nation model will not require substantial transformation of WTO
institutions, change that would be counterproductive to the rest of
the WTO regime.
I. A CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT FOR SUBSTANTIVE
ANTITRUST HARMONIZATION
A variety of arguments have been made to support the interna-
tional harmonization of substantive competition law. Two of the
oldest are also the simplest. First, in a world of multinational
corporations, multiple antitrust regimes raise transactions costs.
17
Second, in a world with extraterritorial application of antitrust
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See Waller, supra note 2, at 385-S9 (noting burdens of multiple antitrust reviews on
business).
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laws, the most restrictive antitrust laws will always govern
business behavior even if those antitrust laws prove suboptimal."8
These traditional arguments do not seem very persuasive by
themselves because they do not attempt to compare the substantial
costs of diverse antitrust laws with the costs of harmonization.
These omissions place us in danger of committing the international-
ist version of the nirvana fallacy: even if uncoordinated national
regimes are inefficient, it does not follow that an international
regime will be more efficient. 19 The transactions costs of complying
with different laws can be substantial in terms of the costs of
professional services,' but these costs seem to be dwarfed by the
question of whether the international rule will prove substantively
better. Moreover, some of the transactions costs of compliance
with multiple laws can be reduced by nonsubstantive harmoniza-
tion-i.e., harmonization of the forms of requests for information.21
Steps for such procedural harmonization are already being taken
bilaterally and unilaterally.22
The debate over substantive harmonization, thus, should center
on whether the decisions under a harmonized legal system are
likely to be better than the sum of the legal applications of diverse
systems. This comparison requires an evaluation of both the
benefits and costs of an international harmonized regime as well as
the benefits and costs of diversified national regimes. As the
standard of comparison, this Article will first utilize the consumer
welfare model of the Chicago School as an economic efficiency
standard.'
18. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 52 (noting that the most restrictive nation
prevails in merger review).
19. Cf Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1969) (discussing tendency of theorists to propose a new policy on the basis of a critique
of the old policy without considering the defects in the innovative structures). Demsetz
described the "nirvana approach" to public policy as considering "between an ideal norm and
an existing imperfect' institutional arrangement." See id. at 1.
20. See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
627, 629 (2001).
21.' See Daniel Steiner, The International Convergence of Competition Laws, 24
MANITOBA L.J. 577, 580 (1997) (explaining procedural harmonization).
22. See id. at 579-80 (displaying in Table 1 examples ofrecent procedural harmonization).
23. For a brief summary ofthe Chicago School, Welfare Maximization Model, see Jessica
L. Goldstein, Note, Single Firm Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law: The Rose Acre
Recoupment Test and the Search for an Appropriate Judicial Standard, 91 COLUx. L. REV.
2003] 555
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A. The Political Economy of Domestic Antitrust
We can best understand whether an international standard
would tend to depart from a consumer welfare model of antitrust if
we understand why national standards, at least within developed
nations, tend to depart from this model in the first place. In
developed nations, several factors tend to make their competition
law depart from the consumer welfare ideal.2'
The first distorting factor is the interest government antitrust
officials have in more than optimally interventionist antitrust rules.
This distortion reflects two kinds of bias. First, such an interven-
tionist set of rules allows antitrust officials to gain more rents.25 In
return for enforcing the antitrust law against a company, officials
can gain rents from competitors. 26 It is true that in refusing to
exercise official discretion to enforce laws against a company,
antitrust officials can obtain rents from that company; however, to
make this threat of enforcement credible, they occasionally have to
enjoy the discretion to intervene and occasionally exercise it.
Second, the antitrust officials charged with intervention have an
interest in the larger budgets and staff that a more interventionist
policy brings. Such a policy permits more prestige to agencies. 27 It
also brings more postbureaucratic employment opportunities, as an
interventionist policy requires many consultants and lawyers to
handle the effects of such policies on behalf of corporations. Broadly
speaking, the first kind of bias-campaign contributions and other
favors from excessive intervention-will tend to affect elected
executive officials and the second kind of bias-prestige and
1757, 1776 n.136 (1991).
24. Full illustration of the several public choice pathologies of antitrust are beyond the
scope of this Article. Accordingly, I will discuss only a few of the more relevant pathologies.
25. "Rents" in this context refers to the antitrust officials' political influence. Even
besides the influence of rent seeking, the mismatch between the short-run horizons of politics
and the long-run horizons of markets may lead to excessive antitrust intervention. See
Donald I. Baker, Government Enforcement of Section Two, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 898, 926
(1986).
26. See Fred S. McChesney, Economics Versus Politics in Antitrust, 23 HARv.J.L. &PUB.
POLY 133, 133-34 (1999) (giving examples of political influence on antitrust enforcement).
27. See id. at 140 (suggesting that increased antitrust enforcement brings favorable
publicity to antitrust agencies).
[Vol. 45:549556
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employment opportunities from the intervention-will tend to affect
the permanent bureaucracy.'
The judiciary or legislature is also unlikely to limit the patholo-
gies of antitrust enforcement. For example, in the United States
antitrust enforcement offers legislators rent-seeking opportunities
similar to those of antitrust officials: they can extract rents by
establishing a system that permits excessive intervention because
they can use legislative hearings and the budget process to
influence the cases executive agency regulators, i.e., the Depart-
ment of Justice's Antitrust Division, bring.29 Moreover, even if
legislators were motivated entirely by the public interest, antitrust
statutes cannot be written like a code, because no code can capture
all anticompetitive business practices.30 Thus, executive regulators
inevitably enjoy substantial discretion to shape the interpretation
28. In the United States private actors can also enforce much of antitrust law through
private causes of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). Nevertheless, private enforcement is
unlikely to correct for public choice bias in favor of excessive antitrust intervention. First,
executive regulators tend to shape the law with their decisions on antitrust, both because
judges are more likely to defer to regulators' judgments and because much private litigation
simply piggybacks on their decisions. See Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation:
The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998) (explaining that
the U.S. antitrust policy largely is defined by the enforcement agencies). Second, the
structure of private litigation has its own structural difficulties. Since private litigation can
be filed by competitors as well as consumers, much private litigation will attempt to advance
theories that protect competitors rather than competition, and as such be excessively
interventionist. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) ("[Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by a reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ... shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." (emphasis added)).
29. See Michael P. Kenny & William H. Jordan, United States v. Microsoft.- Into the
Antitrust Regulatory Vacuum Missteps the Department of Justice, 47 EMORYL.J. 1351, 1376-
77 (1998) (detailing how Senator Orrin Hatch, who was the state Senator for many of
Microsoft's competitors, tried to influence the Department of Justice to bring the Microsoft
case).
30. It is for this reason that United States antitrust law employs a common law rather
than code approach. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911); see also
Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 111. L. Rev. 77,89-92
(explaining that Standard Oil in particular and Rule of Reason in general contemplate
application of evolving economic theory in a manner that could produce changing treatment
of various business practices). Christoper M. Barbuto, Note, Toward Convergence ofAntitrust
and Trade Law: An International Trade Analogue to Robinson-Patman, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
2047, 2055 (1994) (describing the common law character of the Sherman Act, one of the
primary U.S. antitrust laws).
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of antitrust statutes in a manner enabling them to pursue their own
interests.
The judiciary's ability to restrain regulators can also be limited."'
First, regulators can act in a way that makes judicial review of
their actions ineffective. For instance, particularly in Europe,
regulators can act to block a merger and by the time effective
judicial review can reverse that decision, business considerations
may force termination of the merger."2 Second, even in cases where
judicial review is effective, the judiciary has often deferred to the
regulators because there are costs to the judiciary in aggressively
standing up to the democratically elected branches, particularly
when the law, such as antitrust law, does not provide bright-line
rules.33 Finally, the tendency toward self-aggrandizement that
drives bureaucrats is also known to the judiciary. For instance, the
prospect of transforming and supervising an entire industry, as
Harold Greene did with the phone industry, cannot be discounted
as a possible distorting motive.3 ' Thus even if institutionally
constrained, the basic human tendency toward self-aggrandizement
contributes to rules that will permit excessive intervention.
The public, furthermore, in the form of voters, cannot be expected
to exercise much control over the form of competition law. Because
of rational ignorance, the public confronts large agency costs in
monitoring the behavior of legislation and executive action in any
area.3 1 Competition law tends to be quite technical, which tends to
31. See Waller, supra note 28, at 1394-95 (suggesting that antitrust regulators often set
rules with minimum judicial involvement).
32. See Eric S. Hochstadt, Note, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law,
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 300-01 (2002) (suggesting that European regulators have
substantial discretion because of lengthy appellate procedures for judicial review of their
decisions).
33. See Waller, supra note 28, at 1421-23 (explaining why the judiciary has been
reluctant to play a significant role in the shaping of antitrust law).
34. Harold Greene was even called the czar of telecommunications during the pendency
of his oversight regarding the 1984 AT&T/Baby Bell restructuring. See Leslie Cauley,
Telecom Czar Frets Over New Industry Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1996, at B1.
35. Rational ignorance describes the systematic tendency for citizens to pay little
attention to political information. Anthony Downs developed the first theory of voters'
"rational ignorance." See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
The phenomenon occurs because acquiring information is both costly and unproductive. See
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE I1205-06 (1989). It is costly to acquire such information
because individuals must invest time that they could be using in other more productive
[Vol. 45:549558
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exacerbate the difficulties of democratic control over bureaucratic
elites."6
Finally, a heuristic bias contributes to over enforcement. One
must always remember that the central question in antitrust is
whether government intervention will serve to correct anti-
competitive practices better than the market itself." Only when
antitrust intervention will better correct anticompetitive practices
is government intervention justified. The answer to this central
question depends largely on whether one is considering correction
in the short run or long run. In the long run the market erodes
monopoly power, decreasing cartels and monopolies.' Humans,
however, have a heuristic bias that causes them to discount these
long-run facts. Because the future is uncertain, people use a
"representativeness" heuristic, by which they assume that future
patterns of events will resemble the past patterns with which they
are familiar.39 Political actors, both legislative and executive, will
thus tend to underestimate the likelihood of the destabilizing
change that the market brings to cartels and monopolies in the long
run.
enterprises. See id. It is unproductive because, although the principal instrumental use of
such information is to guide voting, the vote of any one individual has little influence on the
outcome of an election. See id.
36. For a discussion of why cognitive ignorance exists on complex matters and how
cognitive ignorance increases agency costs, see John 0. McGinnis, The Partial Republican,
35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1751, 1792 (1994) (book review).
37. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1984).
38. Id.
39. The "representativeness" heuristic tends to make people overconfidently extrapolate
predicted characteristics of a class from a small sample size of which they happen to be
aware. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 23, 24 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982). If the sample consists of events rather than objects, the heuristic should tend to
make people extrapolate uncertain future events from events of which they are aware in a
similarly irrational manner. See id. Thus, individuals will tend to think that future events
will resemble past events more than probability warrants. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Risk
Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 5 (1982). For an important
present day application, see ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 137 (2000) (using
work on "representativeness" heuristic to suggest that people will think that today's stock
market patterns will predict the stock market patterns of tomorrow).
20031 559
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B. The Political Economy of International Antitrust
After considering the reasons why national antitrust laws tend
to be suboptimal, we are in a better position to assess whether
internationally harmonized antitrust will prove more effective than
the current decentralized system. In my view, the international
regime has distinctive costs in the form of higher agency costs and
deprives us of distinctive benefits of the diversified regime in the
form of potentially useful innovations in competition law.
1. Higher Monitoring Costs
International harmonization has a nice ring to it, conjuring
up "an image of citizens of many nations happily singing in har-
mony." 0 In the context of politics, as opposed to music, however,
where individuals may use centralization to gain resources for
themselves, international harmonization can become the song of the
oligarchs."' Agency costs are likely to be higher at an international
level and thus bureaucrats will have more ability to fashion rules
in their own interest. First, average citizens will find the interna-
tional process even more opaque than the domestic process and
thus have more difficulty monitoring those charged with carrying
out antitrust policy.42 For the American citizen, Geneva is more
distant than Washington. Second, more rents are available on a
global scale. If business groups can gain international intervention
in their favor, they can disable a whole world's worth of competi-
tors." Finally, international antitrust regulators, like other
regulators outside the control of government, become a distinct
class with a distinctive interest--growing the international anti-
trust apparatus. This interest, however, is not likely to mirror the
40. John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 Cm. J. INT
L. 381, 393 (2000).
41. See id.
42. See Paul B. Stephan,Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INVL L. & BUS. 681,699 (1997) (noting that "international lawmaking
tends to involve somewhat greater secrecy than does domestic lawmaking").
43. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State:A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1337-38 (1994) (noting that interest groups can obtain
greater gains by influencing national, as opposed to local, legislation).
560 [Vol. 45:549
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interests of their government leaders, let alone the interests of
the average citizen in the world." Because of these costs, rules
fashioned at the international level may be less in the public
interest than the rules in many individual nations.
2. Higher Enforcement Costs
We also must consider the costs of enforcing an international
harmonized regime. The kind of enforcement costs differ depending
on whether an international agency enforces international competi-
tion law directly or individual nations enforce the international
standards themselves. This section will consider each set of costs in
turn. If a substantive regime is to be enforced directly as a matter
of domestic law by international bureaucrats, it will be a regime
without precedent. Its novelty alone may entail substantial costs.
First, any new regime has start-up costs and is more likely to
make errors because of a lack of appropriate traditions, rules, and
institutions. International decision makers will create high agency
costs, for the reasons discussed above.45 Finally, because such an
international corps of decision makers will depend ultimately on the
coalition of support from leaders of nation states around the world,
these decison makers will need to take the national identity of
actors into account when making their decisions, thus distorting the
agreed upon competition principles. Even if they did take substan-
tial account of national government interests, it remains an open
question whether international regulators would have the political
legitimacy to make their decisions stick if a nation state vehemently
disagreed.
Perhaps most costly of all, such a regime would necessitate
changes in the constitutional structures of nation states. For in-
stance, in the United States, the Appointments Clause"6 and the
44. For discussion of the rise of a network of international regulators to enforce such
matters, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct.
1997, at 183, 189-90. I believe that Professor Slaughter underestimates the public choice
costs of such networks, because those regulators will be interested in their own mission and
status and will thus not take account of the public interest.
45. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
2003] 561
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Article III judiciary requirement 47 represent a serious constitutional
bar to giving international decision makers authority to render
decisions that would directly affect the decisions of the United
States."8 The costs of changing such constitutional provisions are
not limited to the costs of the constitutional amendment process.
They also include the cost of destabilizing the constitutional norms
that serve to ameliorate public choice problems of government by
assuring an accountable executive and an independent judiciary.
Even if these norms are worth relaxing for the cause of interna-
tional antitrust harmonization, relaxing them may create costs in
other areas where their loss would not be worth the cost. It is no
answer to say that we can make a case-by-case decision as to
whether the costs are worth paying. Our decision to constitu-
tionalize accountability requirements, such as the Appointments
Clause and the Article III judiciary requirement, represents a
judgment that day-to-day political assessments regarding these
matters will be systematically incorrect.
Another mechanism for antitrust harmonization would be to set
international standards but allow individual nations to enforce
these standards themselves. In other words, the rules would
be centralized, but enforcement would be decentralized. Such a
structure, however, allows for nations to diverge dramatically in
their application of the standards over time. Even within a single
nation, the judiciary has essentially interpreted the same antitrust
law with spectacularly different results in different eras."9 The
results of a structure with centralized standards and decentralized
enforcement could vary widely between nations because a nation's
enforcement of the international standards will be influenced by
that nation's preexisting substratum of competition law.' °
47. U.S. CONST. art. III.
48. See Jim C. Chen, Appointments With Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational
Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1455, 1456-57 (1992) (explaining that direct enforcement of the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement by international arbitrators violates Article Is Appointments Clause
because of the procedures used to select international arbitrators and also violates Article
III because federal judges would be replaced by international arbitrators).
49. See Hochstadt, supra note 32, at 322.
50. See Spencer WeberWaller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization ofLaw:
Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 562-69 (1994) (discussing general theories
on the transferability of laws between diverse nations and implying that harmonized rules
562 [Vol. 45:549
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3. The Loss of Innovation and Competition Through
Substantive Harmonization
It is also necessary to evaluate whether the international regime
would lose any benefits distinctive to the diversified regime through
harmonization. One could argue that antitrust law is unlikely to be
worse under an international system because under a decentralized
system in a globalized world, the most restrictive system will
govern. Even apart from the problem discussed above that agency
costs may make international standards more excessively interven-
tionist than those of any major nation, this argument may not be
correct.51 First, the most restrictive system in a decentralized,
global antitrust system will only govern if that system has jurisdic-
tion with respect to a given antitrust enforcement matter. Even in
a globalized world, some nations will not always have jurisdiction
to apply their antitrust law. For instance, a merger may occur that
has implications for the United States and Asia but which does not
effect Europe. Assuming that Europe is the most restrictive
antitrust regime, its antitrust law would not apply to the merger
when the United States and Asian nations are the only nations to
have jurisdiction. Thus we would have to compare the sum of the
antitrust applications in the decentralized system to that of the
harmonized system to determine the harmonized system's compara-
tive benefit.
Second, and most importantly, we should investigate the
distinctive benefits of a diversified regime in a world that is not
static. In the 1980s, U.S. antitrust law and policy was transformed
to embrace a much more optimal economic regime with a better
focus on consumer welfare.52 One question is whether there will be
some process by which excessively restrictive regimes will undergo
similar transformations. In my view, the different rules operating
within a diversified regime may move to a more optimal level by
enforced nationally rather than internationally will tend to diverge because of different
conceptions and values in different nations).
51. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
52. See ROBERT H. BoRiK, THE ANTrTRUST PARADOX 427 (1993) (suggesting that recent
American courts adopted economic efficiency as the touchstone of antitrust).
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virtue of their very diversity because diversity creates opportunity
for legal innovation and change.
Commentators have rightly noted that competition law applied
to international transactions will not necessarily be optimized by
jurisdictional competition. Because of its extraterritorial reach, a
nation can apply its competition law to firms that do not choose to
locate there" and firms thus cannot exit to put pressure on the
antitrust law to become more optimal. Conversely, if firms could
choose their antitrust law without regard to their domicile, some
might choose the least restrictive regime-which may well prove
suboptimal." Nevertheless even with its imperfections one should
not dismiss the possibility that jurisdictional competition will
do some good. Antitrust law, like business and tax law, affects
business conditions, and nations will prosper insofar as they have
good antitrust rules, at least as applied to purely domestic transac-
tions. While they may then choose to discriminate and apply worse
law to antitrust practices in order to help domestic producers at the
expense of foreign producers or consumers, such a strategy can
be policed by an antidiscrimination rather than substantive anti-
trust regime.
Moreover, even in the absence of the formal conditions for
effective jurisdictional competition through movement of firms, a
decentralized regime will foster innovation and debate in antitrust
law.55 Certainly the European Union's (EU) merger laws have
been heavily criticized when they have prohibited mergers-such
as the GE-Honeywell merger-that the United States has allowed.'
Moreover, this criticism appears to have prompted changes in the
53. Andrew T. Guzman, Essay, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142, 1149 (2001) ("Regardless of the location of a firm and its activities,
many jurisdictions--most notably the United States and the European Union-apply their
own laws to actions that have a local affect.").
54. Id. at 1148.
55. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 685, 707-09 (2002) (positing that global harmonization may restrain innovation). These
information flows conduce to a kind of jurisdictional competition, as Professors Kerber and
Budzinski show. See Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws:
Mission Impossible?, in THE NEW ANTITRUST PARADOM POLICY PROLIFERATION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (M.S. Greve & R.A. Epstein eds., forthcoming 2003).
56. See Hochstadt, supra note 32, at 327-76 (critiquing the EU decision).
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EU regime.57 Conflicting decisions and the resultant tensions can
bring beneficial change by focusing the attention of the press and
other elites outside government circles on the wisdom of govern-
ment antitrust intervention. Such focal points of criticism would be
lost with harmonization.58
It might be argued that centralized institutions could presently
take advantage of the growing knowledge of the Chicago School
antitrust benefits disseminated by graduate students worldwide.
Public choice analysis, however, suggests that knowledge is not a
sufficient condition for good antitrust decision making. 9 The
decision makers need to have the correct motivation. Conflict is
more likely than increased knowledge to produce the correct
motivation, because conflict will give these academic views salience
among the press and other elites.
A thought experiment is helpful in illustrating the way in which
a decentralized regime may be more open to beneficial innovation
than a centralized regime. Assume that antitrust law today was
57. See, e.g., Press Release, EU Institutions, Speech by Mr. Mario Monti, European
Competition Commissioner Review of the EC Merger Regulation-Roadmap for the reform
Project, Conference on Reform of European Merger Control, British Chamber of Commerce
-Brussels, June 4, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/starttcgi/guesten.ksh
(acknowledging criticisms of European merger review process in setting forth reform
proposals).
58. One might argue that European law can be criticized even in the absence of conflict.
Of course, it is true that academics and others can critique antitrust law at any point, but
the question is whether anyone will listen. Political theorists since Machiavelli have noted
that conflicts between officials on fundamental points can engage the public's attention. See
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF Trrus LmvUS, reprinted in
2 THE HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC WRITINGS OF NIcCOLO MACHIAVELLI 98-102
(Christian E. Detmold trans., University Microfilms Int'l 1978).
59. Professor Alan Meese has noted the many instances in which U.S. regulators have
failed to follow the best economic theory. See Meese, supra note 30, at 130-131 (recounting
the United States' position in TOPCO, including assertion that government control of entry
would be superior); Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Reconstructing the Scope
and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 486 (2000) (explaining that
government simply ignored defendants' explanation of the virtues of the restraints involved
in TOPCO); see also Alan J. Meese, Rasing Rivals Costs: Can the Agencies Do More Harm
than Good?, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (detailing government theories on
tying and monopolization that are contrary to sound economic understanding); Alan J.
Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 9 GEO. MASONL. REV. 761,786-790 (2001) (arguing
that standards sought by the United States were outmoded in light of advances in economic
theory from transaction cost economics); Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of
Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 693 (2000) (arguing that the FTC's approach to
monopolization law is biased unduly toward the government).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that of the Warren Court era (a very sorry state from a consumer
welfare perspective).' Under those circumstances, it would be very
likely, even without the additional agency costs of formulating
international rules, that the harmonized regime of that era would
have been suboptimal from the consumer welfare perspective.
Assume further that, as in the 1980s, a laissez-faire revolution
sweeps the United States but does not reach Europe. Changing the
international regime would be more difficult than changing the
United States' regime alone because the international regime would
be much more impervious to being destabilized by a revolution
limited in geographic scope. If the United States' regime were not
transformed, it could not provide an implicit critique of other
national regimes.
Despite the public choice tendencies in the developed world for
excessive antitrust law intervention, revolutions in social thought
and changing political institutions can sometimes upset these
interventionist policies. These revolutions are much more likely to
succeed bit-by-bit in a decentralized regime as they take hold in one
nation and spread by example to others. Innovations emanating
from the United States, in particular, seem to have been responsi-
ble for many beneficial transformations in international competition
law, as well as many other areas of law and culture."' In my view,
it would be a mistake to set up international structures that inhibit
the dynamism of the United States from continuing to exert
maximum influence by example.
The need for continually innovative perspectives on antitrust law
is especially important because the comparative advantage of
government intervention depends on how swiftly the market will
correct for supercompetitive prices in the absence of such interven-
tion."2 This market process in turn depends on transportation,
60. See Christopher R. Leslie,Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion. A Market Failure
Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243,251-52 (1993) (explaining that "the
Warren Court placed emphasis on social and political factors, rather than efficiency").
61. Cf GEOFFREY BLAINEY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD 400-01 (2002) (suggesting
that the United States is an empire by virtue of the power of its ideas rather than its military
conquests).
62. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 2 (suggesting that the scope of antitrust should
be limited to instances in which it has a comparative advantage over market-correcting
forces).
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information costs, and trade restrictions, as a world in which
supplies can be redirected easily from one country to another is a
world in which the market can correct supercompetitive prices more
quickly. 63 The point here is that the appropriate set of rules
authorizing government antitrust intervention may differ depend-
ing on the effectiveness of general market discipline. Intervention
in markets through any bureaucratic rules, no matter how sensible
in the abstract, has potential costs because the government may
make mistakes in rule application. Thus, the optimal shape of
antitrust rules, like market prices themselves, is always changing.
International antitrust enforcers, therefore, benefit from continuing
experimentation to gauge the best contours of competition law.
In contrast, an international regime faces a higher degree of
stasis in its rules than national regimes because the transactions
costs of getting agreement from nearly all nations to change the
rules are higher than the transactions costs of getting change
from a single nation. 4 If, on the other hand, one were to delegate
substantial discretion to international bureaucrats, their power
would exacerbate the problem of agency costs.65
Of course, this analysis assumes that economic efficiency should
be the goal of antitrust law. Other objectives of antitrust law,
however, would be subject to a similar public choice inquiry. First,
why do national antitrust laws fall short of their identified objec-
tives? Second, why do these same difficulties not prevent interna-
tional harmonized antitrust from better realizing these objectives? 6
Thus, whatever the appropriate objectives of antitrust, their
optimal realization depends on considerations of political economy.
63. See A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust
Programs for Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 209, 218 (1994) (noting
that competition from imports "is a countervailing force against whatever power domestic
firms may have to raise prices above the competitive and socially efficient level").
64. Cf William J. Alceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship,
12 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 244 (1997) (detailing transactions costs of international
agreements).
65. See supra Part I.B.1.
66. Even those who understand the political economy of antitrust differently from the
view advocated here must still identify the assumptions underlying their predictions of
government actors' behavior and show why international harmonization would be superior
to national regimes under these assumptions.
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It may be thought that international antitrust norms have some
compensating advantage. I have suggested that in the developed
world there is a tendency for antitrust law to be excessively inter-
ventionist.67 In the developing world, however, the absence of
antitrust law often leads to underenforcement of competition
norms.6" The developing world lacks government infrastructures to
effectively enforce competition law.69 Moreover, in the developing
world, government officials or their families are often partners in
major industries and thus, in contrast to the officials in the
developed world, they can collect rents directly by sharing in the
monopoly profits from collusion and other anticompetitive practices
in which their companies engage.7 °
One might argue that an agreement forged between the devel-
oped and developing world may reach a happy medium, but I am
skeptical. As discussed above, antitrust law must be written with
broad concepts and those charged with enforcing them will be
largely Western bureaucrats who are motivated by the prospect
of the greater prestige and rents that rules permitting excessive
intervention promote. Without a world government or global demos,
the actions of these international enforcers will be difficult to
monitor.
II. THE FAILURE OF DOMESTIC ANTITRUST TO TAKE FOREIGN
INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT
A. Introduction
A new and interesting argument for greater cooperation on
substantive antitrust principles is that nations will systematically
fail to take account of the interests of foreign producers and
67. Cf William H. Page, Antitrust Review of Mergers in Transition Economics: A
Comment, with Some Lessons from Brazil, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 1113, 1115 (1998).
68. See Julian Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony: Can Trade and Competition Law
Work Together in the International Marketplace?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 343, 360-61 (2002)
(discussing the lack of antitrust law in developing nations).
69. See William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls on
Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 1075, 1092 (1998).
70. See id. at 1093-94.
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consumers in their antitrust law and policies.71 Consideration of
foreign producers and consumers, however, is necessary to maxi-
mize global consumer and producer welfare. Thus, application of
antitrust law under national systems will be suboptimal, because
it will not even attempt to maximize consumer and producer wel-
fare generally.72
The argument that decentralized systems result in suboptimal
antitrust enforcement represents the best and most comprehensive
attempt to show that a structure of international competition
law-or least substantive international principles-will represent
an improvement over the present decentralized regime. This
argument is better than traditional arguments" for four reasons.
First, the objective sought-that antitrust laws should be applied
without respect to nationality-is modest and may well command
consensus. Second, the claim that domestic antitrust laws neglect
foreign interests has the ring of truth. Third, as globalism makes
trade more important, it is at least superficially plausible that a
country's failure to consider foreign interests has large costs
because corporate actions-potentially regulated by antitrust-
affect more and more foreign producers and foreign consumers.
Finally, the problem of foreign bias has a clear nexus with coopera-
tion on substantive principles. If the world were to move toward a
single antitrust law enforced by an international organization,
parochial bias might be reduced substantially, if not eliminated,
just as the federal enforcement of antitrust laws in the United
States has reduced concern about state bias."
Professor Andrew Guzman, the leading proponent of this
argument for substantive coordination, employs a relatively simple
model to show that countries will take account of only their own
71. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501,
1512-21 (1998).
72. See id.
73. The traditional arguments in favor of a centralized regime are: (1) decentralized
regimes raise transactions costs; and (2) because in decentralized regimes the most
restrictive regime governs, decentralized regimes result in suboptimal antitrust enforcement.
See supra Part I.
74. Federal antitrust enforcement has not eliminated this concern, as shown by the
suggestion that Senator Hatch, who came from the state of a number of Microsoft's
competitors, influenced the initiation of the Microsoft litigation. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
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citizens' interests.75 Nations simply neglect the interests of foreign
companies and foreign consumers in their calculations of welfare-
maximizing competition policies.76 For instance, a country with only
exporters of a good and no consumers of that good will turn a blind
eye to anticompetitive practices that detract from consumer
welfare.77 Conversely, nations with only consumers and no produc-
ers will not take the increased foreign-producer profits from
transactions such as mergers into account in assessing whether
these transactions should be permitted.78
This tendency to neglect foreign interests can theoretically result
in two kinds of divergences from the competition law that a nation
would have chosen in the absence of trade with other nations. First,
it may simply result in either de jure or de facto exceptions to the
antitrust laws. For example, a nation that generally prosecutes
cartels could simply exempt domestic cartels that affect only foreign
consumers from the ambit of its laws. A nation could also decide to
prevent vertical integration of foreign manufacturers that want to
sell in the nation's markets while permitting vertical integration of
the nation's domestic companies. We will call these divergences
"exception divergences."
Second, if such outright exceptions were not possible, a nation
might change its antitrust law from what it would optimally deploy
in a closed economy-i.e., an economy where only domestic con-
sumers and producers were at issue.79 If a nation consumed less
than it produced and did not distinguish between antitrust laws
affecting consumers and those affecting producers, the nation
would tend to have weaker antitrust laws than it would in a closed
75. See Guzman, supra note 71, at 1512-21.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1512-15.
78. Id. Professor Guzman's general result is: Assuming that nations apply their antitrust
laws extraterritorially, the general result is that
[a] country whose firms are responsible for x% of global production will take
into account x% of the change in global producer surplus generated by a
particular activity. A country whose consumers account for y% of global
consumption will take into account y% of the total change in global consumer
surplus generated by the activity.
Id. at 1520.
79. See Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from
Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 936 (2003).
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economy, because antitrust laws protect consumers while depriving
producers of monopoly profits.' The tendency toward weaker
antitrust laws would be particularly pronounced if the nation ex-
ported imperfectly competitive products, such as pharmaceuticals
and other intellectual property-rich products, because monopoly
profits from exports would redound to the benefit of the nation."
Conversely, if a nation consumed more than it produced, then it
might tend to have stronger laws than it would in a closed econ-
omy. 2 This tendency would be particularly pronounced if the nation
exported perfectly competitive products because antitrust laws
would not affect these products anyway.' I will call this kind of
divergence "distortion divergence" and address these two kinds of
divergence separately.
Professor Guzman suggests that cooperation on substantive
international antitrust provides a potential solution to the problem
of divergences, because international rules and enforcement would
have no reason to discriminate on a parochial basis. Thus, at least
potentially, antitrust enforcement would move to a more optimal
level.
The attractiveness of this solution depends on how problematic
parochial bias is for antitrust and whether there are features of
international harmonization that actually make it likely that
international antitrust principles will move away from the optimal
level of antitrust enforcement. First, I believe that bias may be less
of a systemic problem than Professor Guzman's formal model
suggests. Second, and more fundamentally, bias might compensate
for other public choice problems of antitrust, paradoxically leading
to more optimal competition laws. Third, even assuming that local
enforcement is suboptimal, coordinating substantive international
antitrust rules may sacrifice so much in experimentation and
potential for beneficial transformation that the costs may outweigh
the benefits.
80. Id. at 943.
81. Id. at 947.
82. Id. at 943.
83. See id. at 947.
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B. Institutions and Localism
Professor Guzman is certainly correct in his claim that antitrust
will sometimes be deployed systematically to consider only local
interests and will be biased against foreign interests in some
circumstances. 4 In these cases, exception divergences will result.
For example, Congress has exempted export cartels from the reach
of antitrust laws, 5 and may be influenced by the predominance of
exporter interests in exempting certain sectors from antitrust
altogether. Parochial bias strongly influences Congress and other
democratic legislatures around the world.8'
There remains the question of whether other nations can attack
such cartels under their own laws, thus making it unlikely that
domestic producers can take advantage of the foreign bias in their
domestic laws. For instance, even if the United States authorizes a
cartel, Europe can bring an antitrust complaint under its law if the
cartelized products are shipped to Europe. Now it is true that
some nations may not be able to gain jurisdiction over U.S.
companies or are generally less sophisticated, but these would tend
to be relatively small nations with consequently small losses to
allocative efficiency. Others more familiar than I with jurisdictional
and procedural issues in international antitrust have argued
that there is no need for international agreement on substantive
antitrust principles in this area because individual nations can
challenge cartels.8 7
84. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16-65 (2000).
86. See Robert Sheppard, Towards a UN World Parliament: UN Reform for the
Progressive Evolution of an Elective and Accountable Democratic Parliamentary Process in
UN Governance in the New Millenium, 1 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POLY J. 4 (2000). That foreign bias
can affect antitrust laws should come as no surprise to public choice analysis. Legislators do
not gain by promoting the interests of foreigners, because foreigners do not vote and
foreigners are often prohibited from providing material aid to politicians, such as through
campaign contributions. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441(e) (2000). For similar reasons, constitutions
that attempt to discipline legislators through rules encouraging neutrality among their own
regions are likely to be indifferent, even antagonistic, to foreign interests.
87. See Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of
International Competition Law, 68 ANTTRUST L.J. 711 (2001). First notes, for instance, that
in 1999, the United States alone had fifty active grand jury investigations against cartels by
foreign producers. See id. at 711. He also points out that the United States prosecuted all
sorts of foreign cartels during the 1940s. Id. at 726-32. He concludes powerfully:
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In contrast to such express discrimination, many antitrust
laws are neutral on their face, particularly as between foreign and
domestic producers." When the laws themselves are neutral it is
not clear that foreign interests will be neglected because the legal
institutions charged with carrying them out may not be as subject
to parochial bias as legislators. Let me illustrate this latter point
with some examples from U.S. antitrust enforcement. First, assume
that the United States has only consumers of a particular product.
Will our antitrust system fail to take account of producer surplus
of the foreign companies in deciding whether to challenge a merger?
First, classifying the nationality of multinational corporations is
often difficult. They often have shareholders and employees around
the world and thus government decision makers of many countries
often take substantial account of their interests. Second, advanced
industrial democracies like the United States have developed
formal rules and legal cultures that require decision makers to
consider only those criteria that the law makes relevant. Thus, the
judiciary, and to some extent the bureaucracy, will be constrained
to take foreign interests into account so long as the law does not
formally eliminate them from consideration.
In fact, the International Operations Guidelines issued by the
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission make
clear that unless the law otherwise requires, "[tihe agencies do not
Consider these rhetorical questions: Is there any careful antitrust lawyer today
who would advise a client that there is no risk in forming a cartel to restrict
exports to a "foreign" jurisdiction that has an antitrust regime? Is there any
such lawyer who would advise a client that even if one jurisdiction grants a
statutory immunity for anticompetitive export behavior, that the immunity will
be a defense if the "inbound" jurisdiction decides to prosecute? Is there any
such lawyer who would advise the officers or directors of a client corporation
not to worry personally about participating in a cartel that affects prices in a
foreign country?
Id. at 726-27. I am indebted to Alan Meese for discussions on this point.
88. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-15
(2000). It is interesting to speculate why Congress does not make such parochial distinctions
between foreign and domestic companies in merger laws. If Congress did shape our laws to
be so blatantly discriminatory, the laws would invite retaliation against U.S. companies by
foreign interests. U.S. companies thus might lobby against such discrimination. In contrast,
U.S. consumers are a diffuse group and are not in a position to prevent discrimination
against foreign consumers even if it were to encourage discrimination against U.S.
consumers in foreign competition laws. U.S. law, however, does seem to discriminate against
foreign consumer interests. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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discriminate in the enforcement of the antitrust laws on the basis
of the nationality of the parties." 9 Of course, it is always possible
that decision makers will slight these interests, but it is not entirely
clear what mechanism will guide them to do this. They have craft
interests that militate against such blatant favoritism.
If the antitrust division disapproves a merger, the company
has judicial recourse.9 ° Judges, moreover, are even less likely to
be swayed by such local bias.91 To be sure, sometimes, because of
timing issues, regulators can stop mergers before judges can review
their decisions, but judicial review nevertheless offers some
protection in many cases. Thus, there are a variety of institutional
screens that in the context of the United States make bias less
likely in cases assessing the anticompetitive conduct of foreign
companies.
Now assume that the United States has only producers of a
product and no consumers. Will U.S. antitrust enforcers fail to in-
tervene to protect foreign consumer interests? This scenario may
present more reason to worry. A recent act has suggested that the
interest of foreign consumers need not be taken into account in
most circumstances in initiating antitrust actions.92 The Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations confirm this
stance.9 Even in the absence of such a direction against foreign
bias, in initiating a prosecution, enforcement officials must consider
budgetary constraints. In the context of case selection, foreign bias
may be more likely to creep in under the guise of budgetary
concerns where it is less obvious. Moreover, because there is no
judicial review of an agency's failure to take action, the judiciary
will not be a bulwark against bias.
89. See U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE& FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ,ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUEDELINESFORINTERNATIONALOPERATIONS 3(1995), avaiLable at www.usdoj.govlatr/public/
guidelineainternat.htm [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS].
90. See THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FEDERAL MERGER
REVIEW 29-30 (Ilene K. Gotts ed., 2001).
91. Cf Kevin Claremont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1132 (1996) (suggesting on basis of study that American courts did not
harbor bias against foreigners).
92. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000).
93. See GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 89 (requiring an effect
on U.S. commerce or U.S. producers to assert U.S. antitrust jurisdiction).
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The general lesson of this review is the importance of making our
models institutionally rich. Only then can we assess the degree of
damage that a diverse antitrust regime will inflict through the
tendency toward bias against foreign interests.
C. Public Choice Considerations Countervailing to Foreign Bias
If one believes that public officials do not necessarily enact
and enforce competition laws in the public interest, bias against
foreign interests will not necessarily make antitrust laws depart
from an economically optimal regime.9 ' Indeed, such foreign bias
may counteract the public choice-driven biases against wealth
maximizing laws and thus move competition law toward a more
optimal state.
For example, let us assume that, contrary to their claim that they
treat producers of all nationalities equally, prosecutors in the
United States give greater weight to producer interests when they
are primarily domestic, and less weight to consumer interests
when they are foreign than is justified by antitrust laws. In many
instances, this reweighting may move us toward optimal antitrust
enforcement because it will make prosecutors less likely to go after
monopolies and other commercial practices in the marginal cases
where the public choice factors described above may lead to
overenforcement. 95
One might suggest that bias against foreign interests would have
the opposite effect--creating less optimal antitrust enforcement-
when the United States has almost all the consumers and few of the
producers of a given product. For example, in deciding whether to
allow a merger initiated by a foreign corporation, administrators'
tendency to disallow the merger of a foreign corporation because of
bias toward overenforcement may be exacerbated by a bias against
foreign producer interests. I have already suggested, however, that
because of institutional constraints like an independent judiciary,
foreign bias may have less effect in the merger context.
94. See Guzman, supra note 71, at 1531 (acknowledgingpossible interaction ofdistortions
driven by foreign bias and those driven by public choice considerations).
95. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
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In any event, without a careful investigation of public choice and
institutional factors, one cannot really measure the extent to which
exception divergence moves us away from the optimal enforcement
of neutral antitrust laws.
D. Distortion Divergence of Neutral Laws Because of Foreign Bias
In addition to specific exemptions from antitrust, some suggest
that foreign bias may lead to distortion divergence-leading a
country to alter its laws from the unbiased laws which would have
been in place under a closed economy.' While distortion divergence
is a possibility based on an economic model, it is supported by less
empirical evidence than exception divergence. In fact, there are
some reasons to doubt that distortion divergence is more than a
theoretical possibility. First, a nation's balance between production
and consumption changes, as does the kind of goods it exports. It
seems unlikely that a nation changes its antitrust law to follow
changing patterns of consumption and production-the transactions
costs are too high.97 Second, antitrust law does not appear to track
closely the predictions of the model. Developed nations that export
imperfectly competitive goods tend to have more interventionist
laws than developing nations,9" although the theory suggests that
the tendency would be the opposite.99
In any event, even if such tendencies exist, it is not clear whether
they will make antitrust law better or worse. The optimality of
antitrust law depends on what other forces shape antitrust law. If,
as I have suggested, developed nations tend to deploy excessively
interventionist competition laws, and developing nations tend to
deploy overly lenient competition laws,1" trade is likely to make the
laws better than they would be under a closed economy. For
instance, because of their export of imperfectly competitive goods,
96. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
97. Cf Charles R.B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543, 586
(noting the high transactions costs of changing U.S. patent law).
98. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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the developed nations will adopt laws that are less suboptimally
stringent than they otherwise would in a closed economy.
Thus, even before we look at the costs of choosing a set of
international antitrust principles, it is not clear that the costs of
parochialism are as high as might be assumed initially. The size of
these costs is crucial because they must be weighed against the cost
of coordination of substantive antitrust principles, which I have
suggested may be quite high. First, the high agency costs may lead
to less optimal enforcement than at the local level.' Second, the
loss of experimentation and conflict may decrease the opportunities
for beneficial transformation of competition laws. 0 2
III. A MORE MODEST APPROACH: THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION MODEL
A. Introduction
Quite apart from consideration of antitrust law, the world trade
regime contains a rationale and indeed already a structure for
opposing discrimination in antitrust law.'0 3 In the absence of a
prohibition, nations under the pressure of special interests are
likely to increase the use of discriminatory competition laws as
nontariff barriers, particularly as WTO agreements progressively
reduce tariff barriers.'0 The prospect that discriminatory competi-
tion laws will be substituted for other trade barriers eliminated by
the WTO, although never discussed in the debates over antitrust
harmonization, is in my view the best reason for an antidiscrim-
ination antitrust regime.'0 5 Such substitution furnishes a concrete
101. See supra Part I.B.2.
102. See supra Part I.B.3.
103. The proposal in this Article is very similar to one contained in a paper presented at
the same American Enterprise Institute Conference where I first presented this paper. See
Michael Trebilcock & Edward lacobucci, National Treatment and Extraterritoriality: Defining
the Domains of Trade and Antitrust Policy (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 2), available
at http'/www.aei.org/events/eventID.244,filter/event_detail.asp. The main difference is my
conclusion that only discriminatory rules that interfere with market access should be subject
to dispute resolution. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
104. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REV. 511, 549-52 (2000).
105. This new rationale for a limited antidiscrimination model in antitrust may respond
to some of the objections thoughtful scholars have been lodging against even this modest
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reason to believe the impulse to foreign bias will become stronger
as the WTO clears away other trade restrictions. The WTO already
attempts to prohibit discriminatory regulations that interfere with
the market access of exporters, providing the new regime with
precedent for preventing similar discrimination in competition
regulation.
I stress that my support for an antidiscrimination antitrust trust
regime based on a trade rationale is nevertheless limited in scope,
incremental in application, and sensitive to issues of institutional
design. WTO enforcement of such rules should, at least at first, be
limited to discrimination that creates nontariff barrier substitutes
for tariff barriers such as antitrust rules that discriminate in
market access. Second, until evidence develops that antitrust laws
are applied in a discriminatory manner, the antidiscrimination
rules should apply only to expressly discriminatory laws. Third, if
the WTO thickens its antidiscrimination regime to include discrimi-
natory application of antitrust laws, it should consider ways of
assuring nondiscrimination through domestic institutions rather
than increasing the power of WTO tribunals. For instance, the
antidiscrimination regime might provide a safe harbor for nations
that have administrative directives not to discriminate on the basis
of nationality and an independent judiciary.
Finally, there appears to be evidence that antitrust issues were
some of the so-called Singapore issues that contributed to the
failure of the recent trade talks in Cancun. " Although the modest
antidiscrimination provisions that I would favor adding were almost
certainly not at the center of the breakdown, I believe that these
provisions are not nearly important enough to warrant endangering
the talks which have much more important issues, like reducing
agricultural subsidies.
form of international antitrust. For instance, as this Article was in press, Professor Edward
Swaine noted that an antidiscrimination regime would still have to permit nations to enter
into bilateral deals for information exchange and other cooperation, thus weakening the force
of the nondiscrimination principle. See Edward A. Swaine, Against Principled Antitrust, 43
VA. J. INTL L. 959, 970 (2003). These deals would not appear to detract, however, from the
overriding purpose of an antidiscrimination model offered here because they would be
unlikely to raise substantial substitute barriers against goods from any nation.
106. See Jeffrey Schott, Unlocking the Benefits of World Trade, THE ECONOMIsT, Nov. 1,
2003, at 65.
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In any event, an antidiscrimination approach has several
advantages over substantive harmonization. It would preserve a
diversity of antitrust approaches. Conflict on the substance of
antitrust law could still occur, generating publicity and cutting
through agency costs. Better norms could thus still evolve from the
debate that diversity may engender. Another advantage of this
system would be that neither its formulation nor enforcement
would be subject to the peculiarly high agency costs and other
public choice problems involved in choosing substantive rules.
I caution that I am sketching a regulatory ideal of an anti-
discrimination antitrust regime. Many of the best features of such
an ideal, such as excising antidumping laws applied to foreign
producers when they are inconsistent with the antitrust laws
applied to domestic producers, are unlikely to be realized in the
short term because of political obstacles in the Doha Round.° 7 It is
useful, however, to understand our baselines before the political
compromises begin.
B. The Shape of a WTO Antidiscrimination Regime in
Competition Law
With respect to the antidiscrimination model, the WTO offers
precedent for the content of the model's rules because the WTO,
with few exceptions, forbids its members to discriminate against
other members in their regulatory regimes rather than imposing
substantive restrictions on the content of regulation. Under a
limited antidiscrimination regime, the WTO thus affords a better
institutional match than United Nations Committee on Trade and
Development, the Organization for International Cooperation or
Development, or other forums that have been suggested for the
development of an international competition structure.'0 8 Moreover,
an antidiscrimination international antitrust regime will not
107. For a discussion of the various political obstacles facing an international antitrust
regime in the Doha Round, see Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INTL L. 1, 37
(2002).
108. See Consumer Policy and Multilateral Competition Frameworks Discussion Paper
(copy on file with author).
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threaten to transform the WTO into a regime with very high agency
costs, because it will not set a precedent for substantive regulatory
rulemaking.
To understand the way the WTO naturally generates an
antidiscrimination model, it is useful to explain the basic political
economy of the WTO regime. The WTO creates a structure moving
toward freer world trade by creating a reciprocal relation between
domestic tariff reductions and those in other countries, thereby
changing the constellation of political interests at play in debates
over tariff reductions.' °9 The benefits that exporter groups gain
from low tariffs abroad cause them to enter the political struggle
against the protectionist interest groups at home, thus virtually
representing the public's interest in wealth-enhancing free trade. 110
The WTO thus blunts the ability of protectionist interest groups to
obstruct lower tariffs that would benefit the majority of citizens in
their countries.' Under this view, the WTO is a regime that
facilitates democratic choice within individual states even as it
increases wealth by decreasing tariff barriers." 2
The reduction of tariffs, however, does not make interest groups
disappear. Rather, it merely causes them to adopt more subtle
strategies of protectionism. They have a tendency to substitute
nontariff barriers for the reduced tariffs so they can continue to
earn rents.13 An important kind of nontariff barrier is discrimina-
tory regulation. Discriminatory health and safety regulation is well
known, and much of the current WTO dispute settlement regime is
aimed at providing avenues for government to challenge such
109. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 157-74 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the reciprocal nature
of the Most Favored Nation obligation of the WTO).
110. See McGinnis& Movsesian, supra note 104, at 545 (noting that "producers that enjoy
a comparative advantage gain new markets when foreign countries reduce tariffs... [which]
creates incentives for such producers to lobby for lower tariffs in their own countries").
111. Id. at 546.
112. See id.
113. For a general discussion of the manner in which concentrated interest groups
will attempt to substitute one kind of rent seeking for another kind that is blocked by the
political system, see John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a
Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 428-29 (1999).
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discriminatory regulation as part of the dispute settlement
system. 114
Quite apart from any interest in harmonization for the sake of
the efficiency of the antitrust law, the WTO regime should begin to
prohibit discriminatory antitrust laws that interfere with market
access. Otherwise, protectionist interest groups will have a
tendency to substitute such discriminatory rules and frustrate the
effect of tariff reductions. This development can detract from the
entire WTO regime because exporter groups will not have ex ante
incentives to fight for lower tariffs in their home country if they
recognize that their reciprocal gains abroad can be reduced by such
a strategy. One example of discriminatory antitrust regulations
that detract from market access is discriminatory restrictions on
importing companies that prevent these companies from integrating
vertically with domestic companies, if such mergers would facilitate
competition against domestic companies. Other discriminatory
practices might include refusing to apply for the benefit of foreign
companies' rules against boycotts or a domestic requirement of
providing competitors an "essential facility,""5 even when domestic
companies receive the advantage of such rules.
As best construed, Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT"),16 which embodies GATf's national treatment
requirement, already provides such protections in some instances.
But it would be immediately helpful to clarify that Article III
applies to competition law. Moreover, it is clear from the case law
that GATT's Article III as written would not reach all discrimina-
tory antitrust legislation that could interfere with market access." 7
In the long run the WTO could establish a separate agreement to
make national treatment principles more comprehensive and
concrete in the area of competition law, as previous GATT rounds
have provided separate agreements that make national treatment
principles more comprehensive and concrete in such contexts as the
114. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 104, at 566-72 (explaining the anti-
discrimination model of the WTO).
115. For a discussion of"essential facilities" doctrine, see Epstein, supra note 68, at 367
(advocating the WTO's adoption of the doctrine).
116. General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-n, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
117. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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regulation of organisms and their products... and in technical
regulation of products.'19
Article III, paragraph 4, in particular, requires only that a
member nation refrain from providing less favorable treatment to
foreign "like products."12 Given the "like products" element of the
requirement, a nation conceivably could apply its competition law
differently depending on the product at issue, so long as it applied
the competition law equally to the same product.12' If the new low
cost provider of a product, for instance, were a foreign importer, a
nation could permit boycotts and other anticompetitive processes to
frustrate all new entrants, both domestic and foreign, on the
grounds that the actual incidence of the anticompetitive process
would fall mostly on the foreign imports. A WTO panel actually
gave this limited but defensible reading to Article III, paragraph 4
when it held that Japan had not discriminated against U.S.
photographic film producers because its competition law treated
Japanese film producers in the same way.'22 Left unexplored in the
opinion was whether Japan was applying its competition law in the
photographic film industry as it does in other industries."2 The
problem of divergent application of antitrust laws driven by foreign
118. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex LA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/englishdocs.e/legaLe/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
119. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS---RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994), available at
http'//www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/17-tbt.pdf.
120. GATT art. III. Article III, paragraph 4 of GATT provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation
of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
Id
121. See id.
122. See Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper. Report of
the Panel, WT/DS44/R, 110.378-10.382 (Mar. 31,1998) [hereinafter Japanese Film Report].
123. See id
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bias is likely to become a bigger problem as the General Agreement
on Trade in Services reduces other kinds of barriers in an increas-
ing number of service sectors. 
124
If evidence develops that discriminatory application of antitrust
laws does become a substantial problem, the WTO can require that
antitrust laws be applied consistently at least within the same
sectors of the economy where there is little justification for applying
different kinds of antitrust laws.1" There is precedent in the WTO
for a broader requirement of legal consistency. For instance, the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) Agreement-the
GATT agreement that regulates food regulation-requires members
to avoid "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between mem-
bers where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on
international trade."126 The contemplated WTO competition agree-
ment could deploy a similar consistency requirement, requiring
nations not to vary their competition law arbitrarily depending on
the products and services at issue at least when such products or
services are within the same sector. As discussed below, such a
requirement should be even easier to apply than the SPS consis-
tency requirement.1 27 To avoid requiring WTO dispute resolution
process to engage in unnecessary scrutiny an agreement could
create a strong presumption that a law is not discriminatory when
nations have enforcement guidelines that do not distinguish among
nationalities of corporations and when they have an independent
judiciary to scrutinize the application of antitrust laws.
Of course, even a requirement of legal consistency will not assure
market access if a nation like Japan refuses to punish anti-competi-
tive behavior even when directed against its own citizens.128 In that
case, however, the nation must resist the application of an antitrust
124. See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 28-30,
33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
125. The Doha proposals would permit nations to have different antitrust rules for
different sectors. See, e.g., Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy, Including Transparency, Non-Discrimination and Procedural Fairness:
Background Note by the Secretariat, WT/WBTCP/W/209, at 35 (Sept. 19,2002), available at
httpJ/www.wto.org.
126. SPS Agreement, supra note 118.
127. See infra Part III.C.
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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regime that would benefit not only their consumers generally, but
domestic producers entering the full range of their product markets.
Thus, an invigorated consistency rule would make it harder for a
nation to engage in covert discrimination in market access.
It is important to note one potential conflict between an anti-
discrimination antitrust model and the WTO regime.'29 Currently,
the WTO regime permits antidumping laws under certain condi-
tions. "0 Antidumping laws generally permit tariffs to be raised on
foreign imports if they are sold at a price lower than the price in
their home country or lower than the cost of production. 131 In
contrast, domestic antitrust often (as in the United States, for
instance) permits suits against domestic companies only if their
cost is lower than their cost of production and even then only
under very defined circumstances. 13 1 More generally, a nation's
antidumping regime is at war with the consumer welfare model of
its antitrust regime, because antidumping remedies are intended
to protect competitors rather than competition.133 Thus, any regime
that has consumer welfare as its goal in antitrust, but deploys
antidumping laws, is potentially subject to attack under a serious
antidiscrimination antitrust regime that seeks to guarantee market
access. For political reasons, it may not be possible to subject
antidumping laws to the discipline of an antitrust anti-discrimina-
tion model. Indeed, the difference between our antitrust regime and
the antidumping regime offers a practical measure of the en-
trenched power of interest groups and xenophobia to inhibit wealth-
creating free trade. Nevertheless, there would be no difficulty from
the perspective of ideal free trade if an antitrust antidiscrimination
129. See generally Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing Our Views Toward Recoupment
and Market Power: Attacking the Antidumping/Antitrust Dichotomy Through WTO-
Consistent Global Welfare Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69 (1996) (describing tension
between antitrust and antidumping law).
130. See GATT art. VI (permitting GATI members to raise tariffs in response to dumping
by importing nations).
131. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000).
132. See Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic Development, 32
TEL INT'L L.J. 209, 219-21 (1997).
133. For discussion of this tension, see generally Richard D. Boltuck & Seth Kaplan,
Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation Be Reconciled?, 61 U.
CIN. L. REv. 903 (1993).
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regime eventually undermines GAIf's permission for antidumping
laws.
Finally, the WTO regime also is best interpreted to permit
nations to apply their antitrust laws to activities in other jurisdic-
tions so long as those activities affect that jurisdiction. As I have
discussed elsewhere, permitting nations to regulate activities that
affect their citizens, wherever they occur, is consistent with long-
established legal norms and promotes more regulations that will be
more responsive to the interests of citizens than those generated by
a distant international bureaucracy." 4 In contrast, for some of the
same reasons, nations generally should not be permitted to apply
their antitrust law to practices whose effects are limited to foreign
nations. Domestic authorities are not well positioned to assess the
needs or views of foreign citizens, nor are they easily accountable
for the effects of their decisions on foreigners."15 Thus, the WTO
rationale and practices would suggest that nations have the
authority to apply their competition laws extraterritorially so long
as their regulation meets an effects test.
C. The Constraints of Antidiscrimination Rules and the
Minimization of Agency Costs
The public choice problems described in Part I will affect
antidiscrimination rules, even ambitious rules beyond the modest
ones I recommend currently, far less than substantive rules because
antidiscrimination rules remove most policy discretion from
international decision makers. The WTO, for instance, already
enforces antidiscrimination principles with respect to other
regulations with a variety of procedure-oriented rules that eschew
the kind of policy decisions that can be distorted by public choice
factors, including bureaucratic interests. The WTO's antidiscrim-
ination jurisprudence considers whether a nation's rules are
transparent, are consistently applied with respect to foreign and
134. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 104, at 574 (noting that transparency
requirements in international law facilitate representative democracy).
135. See id.
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domestic producers, and avoid regulatory processes that are
unnecessary to advance the regulations' objective.' 6
For instance, the transparency requirement does not require
substantive judgments and yet helps assure that both foreign and
domestic producers face similar compliance costs for antitrust
regulations. 137 Foreign firms may have greater difficulty complying
with generally applicable regulations because domestic producers
may better understand the opaque requirements of their own
bureaucracy. 3 8 Transparency helps exporters compete on an equal
basis by making regulatory compliance easier.1 3 9
Even transparent regulations, however, can have an unequal
incidence on foreign and domestic producers or foreign and domestic
consumers if they are applied unequally. "0 Thus, if evidence
developed inconsistent application were a serious problem, the
antidiscrimination regime would need to make sure the regulations
are applied consistently. Evaluating consistency would not require
a review of the substance of a nation's competition regulations, just
a comparison of its treatment of foreign producers or consumers
and its treatment of domestic producers or consumers.
This comparison in fact should likely be easier than similar
comparisons undertaken by the WTO in evaluating health and
safety regulations because a consistency evaluation in that context
requires identifying the health and safety objectives served by a
myriad of health and safety regulations. For example, in order to
decide that an Australian regulation prohibiting the importation of
salmon was discriminatory, the WTO compared this regulation with
weaker regulations relating to domestic herring which it concluded
posed higher risks."'
136. For a fuller discussion of this jurisprudence, see id. at 572-83.
137. Id. at 574.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Edward A. Laing, Equal Access INon-Discrimination and Legitimate
Discrimination in International Economic Law, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 246, 296-97 (1996).
140. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 104, at 575 (discussing unequal application
as an "opportunity for disguised protectionism").
141. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon: Report to the Appellate Body,
WT/DS18/AB/R, It 154-58 (Oct. 20, 1998), available at http:J/www.wto/org/english/tratop-e
/dispu subjects-indexe.htm.
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In the competition context, in contrast, nations tend to have
somewhat more unified rules focusing on improving competition. A
WTO consistency requirement would not address the difficult
question of which regulation affecting domestic producers provides
an appropriate comparison to the allegedly inconsistent regulation
affecting foreign producers, but rather would address the simpler
question of whether the nation's competition law was applied
consistently across different products. The WTO Competition Code
should also adopt a stance of substantial deference to enforcement
decisions if those decisions were reviewed domestically by a
judiciary genuinely independent of the executive and structured in
such a way that it substantially eliminates the possibility of foreign
bias. 4
2
One final danger would be that nations might add procedural or
substantive requirements that do not advance their legitimate
antitrust objectives simply because those regulations impose
greater costs on foreign producers. If evidence of this kind of
problem developed the antidiscrimination regime could use
precedent in the WTO to apply the least restrictive alternative
requirement to eliminate provisions extraneous to competition
objectives. The review would not be deeply substantive and thus
subject to public choice pathologies, because it would not need to
identify the competition objectives that the law served, but rather
would only make sure that the regulations served those objectives
and were not the cause of discrimination. 4
D. Enforcement of WTO Antidiscrimination Competition Law
Decisions
If antitrust harmonization took place within the WTO, another
advantage of a nondiscrimination regime would be that such
harmonization would not require construction of a new and
untested institution, because tribunals are already familiar with
142. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (noting that, in the United States,
review by an independent judiciary mitigates concerns regarding antitrust enforcement bias).
143. See Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1999) (noting that the least restrictive means test allows governments
to pursue their chosen objectives).
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applying a nondiscriminationjurisprudence. The dispute resolution
system within the WTO also minimizes the enforcement problems
discussed earlier. 44 It requires international review of domestic
decisions, avoiding the parochial interpretation of its principles that
will, over time, lead to divergence.' 45 Yet WTO rulings are binding
only as a matter of international law. 14 6 They have no direct effect,
leaving the final decision to implement the ruling to member
states.147 They thus permit domestic systems of constitutional
accountability to work and avoid the substantial costs of direct
implementation of international rulings. 8
Even without direct effect, the WTO nevertheless deploys a fairly
effective method of gaining compliance with its rulings. If a nation
does not comply with a ruling of the WTO, the offended nation
generally can seek to withdraw concessions from the offending
nation in value equal to the harm that the violation of WTO rules
causes.149 For instance, if a nation were found to have violated the
Competition Code by failing to afford a foreign market entrant the
protection that it gave to domestic market entrants, the offended
foreign nation would be authorized to raise its tariffs on a product
of the offending nation in the amount of the value of the violation.
The theory is that such sanctions will energize the exporters
adversely affected by the sanctions to lobby their governments to
comply with the WTO ruling."
144. See supra Part I.B.2.
145. For problems of national interpretation of international principles, see generally
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
146. See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 49 (2001).
147. See id.
148. For problems involved in loss of constitutional accountability, see supra notes 46-48
and accompanying text.
149. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Agreement art. 4.10,
7.8, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND voL 27 (1994), available at
http//docsonline.wto.org/genbrowseDetail.asppreprog=3; see also Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes (1994), WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art.
22.4, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS7-RESULTS OFTHE URUGUAYROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994),
available at http:/wto.orglenglish/docs-z/legal-e/legaLe.htm (providing that the WTO can
authorize an offended member to either receive compensation or retaliate by withdrawing
concessions and that the retaliation must be "equivalent" to the loss the offended member
has sustained).
150. See Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Ruling: An Interest Group Analysis, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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Given the institutional precedent of the WTO, dispute resolution
under the WTO (or at least withdrawal of concessions authorized by
dispute resolution) should be available only for violations of the
WTO Competition Code provisions that impair market access.
Thus, for instance, decisions by nations designed to immunize
export cartels from antitrust scrutiny would not be subject to
dispute resolution. The reason is that extending dispute resolution
to competition law that does not affect the market access of
exporters would impose costs on exporters with no corresponding
benefits.
As discussed above, the WTO structure relies on exporters to
lobby for lower tariffs in their own countries in return for conces-
sions abroad.151 The prospect of future sanctions will reduce ex
ante the value of these concessions and cause exporters to lobby
less for the lowering of tariffs in their own countries. This cost is
worth paying if, as I have argued above, enforcing a prohibition on
discriminatory regulation is necessary to prevent nations from
substituting discriminatory regulations-including discriminatory
antitrust regulations that affect market access-for tariff
barriers."12 If the discriminatory antitrust regulations, however, do
not affect market access, as when a nation permits export cartels at
the expense of foreign consumers, the use of WTO sanctions to
enforce a prohibition against such regulations will impose costs on
a class of companies that does not receive benefits from the
enforcement. As a result, expanding the withdrawal of concessions
beyond market access issues would tend to reduce the expected
value of the WTO regime to exporters and thus diminish their
activism in support of the rounds of reciprocal tariff reductions that
are at its heart. 5
151. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part III.A.
153. It might be argued that some exporters already expect that they will not be net
beneficiaries from the dispute resolution process, because they will know from their position
that they will be a likely target of sanctions. I agree that because exporters do not operate
under a perfect veil of ignorance with respect to the likelihood of sanctions, some might, on
net, prefer no dispute resolution regime. That is no reason, however, to add provisions to the
dispute resolution regime that will not help any exporters. That burden is likely to weaken
support among all exporters who are keys to the dynamic that powers the GATT.
Others suggest that some other provisions of the GAIT, such as antidumping provisions,
do not help exporters at all. It is true that exporters would be better off generally without
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Even if the WTO should not provide full dispute resolution for
violations of antidiscrimination norms that are unrelated to market
access, other vehicles may be available for the WTO to monitor
compliance with such norms. A competition committee could issue
periodic reports and such reports could create pressure for nations
to change their practices.154 Because of the WTO's experience in
applying antidiscrimination rules, as discussed above, it may be a
useful forum for such reports."
E. Objections
I address two possible objections to limiting international
antitrust within the WTO to a nondiscrimination regime rather
than adding the requirement, as the Doha Declaration appears to
contemplate, that all WTO members also be held to certain "core
principles of competition." The first is that nondiscrimination
principles are insufficient to force nations to treat foreign interests
equally. Some countries, for example, may choose to have no
antitrust law because they want to help their producers at the
expense of foreign consumers. Moreover, it may not be rational for
a small country to have an antitrust law, because it will not possess
the clout to apply its competition law extraterritorially to protect its
own consumers.
5 7
An international agreement could address this second point by
requiring other nations to permit the extraterritorial application of
another nation's laws, at least on the same antitrust theories
deployed by the nation whose producers are the target of the
antitrust enforcement. Thus, a nation would no longer have an
international process obstacle to the enforcement of antitrust laws.
any antidumping provisions. The dispute resolution system, however, enforces GATT's
provisions that limit the scope of antidumping provisions and these limitations do serve the
interests of exporters.
154. The WTO has created more informal structures, such as the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, which encourages nations to improve their laws from a trade perspective. Trade
Policy Review Mechanism, WTO Agreement, Annex 3, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND voL 31 (1994), available at httpJ/www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/
29-tprm-e.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2003).
155. See supra Part III.C.
156. For a description of the Doha Declaration, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
157. See Guzman, supra note 71, at 1539-40.
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The WTO regime should not, however, require nations to choose
some particular form of antitrust law. Small, undeveloped nations
rationally may choose a low level of antitrust enforcement for
reasons wholly related to their domestic situation rather than to
any foreign bias.158 First, given vigorous international trade, small,
developing nations may best conclude that monopoly prices of both
domestic and foreign products can be best constrained by foreign
competition rather than domestic antitrust intervention. 159 The
smaller the size of a nation's market, the easier it is for a foreign
company to redirect part of its supply to discipline any super-
competitive prices in that nation.6 ' Thus, a small nation may rely
on free trade rather than competition laws to promote consumer
welfare. Second, if, as I have argued, the central question in anti-
trust is the comparative advantage of corrective market processes
and government intervention,' such nations may rationally take
account of their relatively weak institutional competence in
assessing the likelihood that government intervention will lead to
better results than market processes.6 2
Finally, there are nonfrivolous arguments that, in a variety of
situations, no antitrust enforcement will be superior to the anti-
trust enforcement of a particular government." An advantage of a
diversified system is that some countries can test this regime while
others study its fruits. It is no answer to say that cartels are always
bad, because distinguishing a horizontal agreement that constitutes
an anticompetitive cartel from one that may have market benefits
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 63, at 218.
161. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
162. Conversely, antitrust scrutiny might be more stringent in countries that have
government-created barriers to entry than in countries that facilitate entry. Antitrust also
might be more stringent in countries with poorly developed capital markets, where starting
a new, large business is difficult or in countries with poorly developed corporate law, since
the absence of such law might make it more difficult for new firms to enter. Mark Roe
similarly suggests that the content of a country's corporate law and nature of relationships
between shareholders and managers can depend upon the nature of other institutions. MARK
J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE 223 (1994). I am grateful to Alan Meese for drawing my attention to the analogy to
Roe.
163. See generally Lino A- Graglia, Is Antitrust Obsolete?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 11,
21 (1999) (arguing that in many instances antitrust law "does more harm than good").
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is a matter of debate even under U.S. antitrust law. 164 Thus, the
antidiscrimination model of antitrust harmonization should oppose
substantive harmonization even if it is limited to "core principles"
or some other formulation that would impose a standard scope for
some kinds of antitrust and inhibit innovative rules, including the
absence of government intervention, in the area of horizontal
agreements. 1
65
Next, some may suggest that each WTO member should be
required to enforce core antitrust principles on the analogy that the
WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs) requires WTO members to enforce core intellectual
property principles. 166 The theoretical and practical reasons that
call for enforcing substantive intellectual property principles
through the WTO do not apply to substantive antitrust rules. First,
certain nations have no incentives to provide any intellectual
property laws at all.'67 For instance, consider a small developing
nation with few, if any, inventors.6 ' That nation has no incentives
to provide patent protection, because it would conclude rationally
that it is better to free ride on the inventions of others." 9 Indeed,
even if a small developing nation had some inventors, it would have
no incentives to provide patent protection because creators in their
nations would reap sufficient rewards by obtaining patent protec-
tion abroad.
170
The case concerning antitrust is different. All nations have
consumers and thus all nations have incentives to have antitrust
laws. These incentives may not be perfect and may be affected by
164. For instance, in BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Supreme Court held that price
fixing ancillary to the creation of a blanket license of copyrighted works should be analyzed
under the Rule of Reason, even though it was literally price fixing. See also United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (price fixing by Ivy league schools analyzed underthe
Rule of Reason); Rothery Shortage v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(price fixing ancillary to a joint venture analyzed under the Rule of Reason).
165. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing Doha agenda that contemplates
enforcement of core antitrust principles).
166. For discussion of the enforcement provisions of TRIPs, see WATAL, supra note 146,
at 49.
167. See Duffy, supra note 55, at 698-99 (explaining the international externalities of
intellectual property systems that justify TRIPs).
168. This example was developed originally by John F. Duffy. See id.
169. See id. at 698.
170. Id.
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the mix of imported and exported goods, but that is true of all
regulations. Nevertheless, the WTO does not and should not require
nations to have a floor of health, safety, labor or other regulations
because of the public choice defects involved in international
regulatory regimes.17' The WTO requires only that these laws be
nondiscriminatory-this is the proper analogy for a competition
regime. This Part has shown how these antidiscrimination princi-
ples may be deepened in the context of competition law.
Second, TRIPs, unlike international antitrust standards, may
have been so important to further tariff reductions that they needed
to be included within the WTO. The intensely pragmatic reasons for
the inclusion of TRIPs into the WTO go to the heart of the dynamic
that fuels the WTO's reciprocal tariff reductions. The developing
world most wanted tariff reductions in textiles and agriculture
where it often holds a comparative advantage. The developing
countries, however, could only succeed in obtaining these reductions
with the help of the most powerful exporters in the developed
nations. These exporters, such as film producers and pharmaceuti-
cal companies, had exports that made use of intellectual property.
The exporters would not have been enthusiastic, however, about the
prospect of increasing their exports to the developing world through
reciprocal tariff reductions, if the developing world continued to
expropriate what was, in their view, their intellectual property.
Accordingly, the grand bargain at the heart of the Uruguay Round
required nations, particularly developing nations, to adopt mini-
mum standards for intellectual property in return for the agree-
ment of developed nations to lower tariffs on textiles and agricul-
ture. 72 I know of no evidence that key export sectors are demanding
substantive harmonization of competition law as a price for making
fundamental tariff reductions in the coming rounds of WTO talks.
CONCLUSION
Substantive antitrust harmonization is inadvisable because it has
high agency costs and will reduce beneficial, long-run experimenta-
171. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 104, at 552-53.
172. See, e.g., WATAL, supra note 146, at 9-47 (discussing this bargain).
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tion and innovation in antitrust. In contrast, an antidiscrimination
antitrust model has fewer agency costs, particularly if it is limited
in scope, because the antidiscrimination precedent of the WTO will
provide a stable guide to the development of antidiscrimination
rules. The antidiscrimination regime also will allow continued
beneficial experimentation and innovation in competition law.
Moreover, insofar as this regime helps police nations' denial of
market access to importers, it will advance the goals of free trade
by inhibiting nations from substituting discriminatory competition
laws for tariff and other barriers that the WTO has already
eliminated.
